L
OCAL GOVERNMENT is one of the most scrutinized and consistently reformed institutions in America, due in part to the notoriety of political party "machines." Citizen perceptions of effective, efficient, accountable, and equitable governance have prompted change in the structure of local government, its officials and policies. Local government delivers most of the public services on which citizens have come to rely. Certainly, the local polity is the most accessible and is expected to approximate the ideals of a responsive democratic government.
Those who champion urban reform contend that the proliferation of governmental units within the metropolis diffuses authority. They assert that, under a consolidated government, there would be greater coordination and accountability, as well as resolution of intercommunity inequities (Rusk 1995) . Often, however, these proponents are too uncritical of empirical analysis and shirk from probing conventional wisdom.
In the case of Jacksonville-Duval County, which became unified in 1968, the proponents of metropolitan reform were the chamber of commerce, the media, banks, city officials, academics, manufacturers, utilities, central-city homeowners, and the League of Women Voters (ACIR 1962) . The opponents
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A Reassessment of the Jacksonville Experience Bert E. Swanson were county government employees, suburban commercial interests, rural homeowners, and farmers. Community elites were primarily concerned about efficiency, but some social scientists question whether city-county consolidation achieves this objectiveDespite the strong interest in metropolitan reorganization, there is no hard evidence to demonstrate that city-county consolidation and more comprehensive arrangements are more efficient than the usual fragmented metropolis…. Are externalities really less of a problem with metropolitan government, are consolidated governments really more responsible, are services really better coordinated with a comprehensive arrangement? (Stone, Whelan, and Murin 1979, 26) Regionalism, as reflected in consolidation and other approaches to metro reform, may expand the economy and enhance the revenue base of government, but does economic growth benefit some at the expense of others? Harrigan and Vogel (2000) have concluded that urban reformers achieve their goals and objectives more in some cities than others and that a social-class and partisan bias works against working, lower class minorities. Moreover, in some cases, reforms actu-ally increase fragmentation and reduce accountability of political leaders to the citizenry. Glendening and Reeves (1977, 299) have found, for example, that interlocal agreements appear to be the most feasible but least effective reform option, whereas consolidation appears to be most effective but less politically feasible. Scott (1968) has suggested that the "threshold of acceptability" is an arrangement somewhere between county reorganization and metropolitan federation. Often, the reality of reform and its ideal do not jibe (Wingo 1974 ). Despite such critiques by scholars, reformers continue to advocate consolidation as a preferred means to resolve metropolitan problems by eliminating fragmented governmental authority, duplication of public functions and effort, inefficiency of local governments, incessant intergovernmental squabbles, and many fiscal inequities among citizens.
This article suggests that those engaged in governmental structural change in Jacksonville and those considering a similar reform proposal today need to understand that (1) metropolitan reform may harm minorities, enhance the power of corporate elites, and result from political manipulation; (2) metropolitan reform battles reveal the interplay of local government and the private sector and reflect the current balance of power between the two; (3) administrative reform overshadows other political values; and (4) metropolitan cooperation and governance solutions are often achieved by avoiding controversy and manufacturing consent.
There are two distinct perspectives on metropolitan reform. On the one hand, community elites (labeled "justifiers") promote consolidation as a vehicle to reform local government, enhance economic development, and more efficiently provide urban services. On the other hand, social scientists (i.e., "clarifiers") raise questions about evidence of greater efficiency and improved economic performance of merged governments. They also point to other values such as local autonomy and equity, noting minority dilution concerns and changes in "who wins." Their research, more often than not, undermines reform prescriptions.
Context
Concerned about rapid growth, urban sprawl, and the unmet needs of those who lived in the unincorporated areas (comprising more than half of the state's population)-including better schools, improved roads, adequate water and sewer lines, and storm-water drainage systems-the State of Florida provided funds for localities to design consolidation plans. Nevertheless, Tallahassee-Leon County voters rejected consolidation plans four times; Gainesville-Alachua County and TampaHillsborough County voters, three times each. Voters rejected these proposals by as much as two or more to one, and some proposals were dismissed before being placed on the ballot.
By the 1960s, Jacksonville-Duval County experienced a major population shift to its unincorporated area; 300,000 resided in the unincorporated area, reducing the centralcity population to less than 200,000. Twofifths of the inner-city population comprised African Americans, who were expected to become a majority by 1972 (Kerner 1968) . The shift reflected one form of public choice (i.e., "white flight"). Compared with 15 percent in the unincorporated area, 30 percent of the city's population lived below the poverty line in deteriorated and dilapidated housing. Private water and sewer treatment facilities and public safety functions were inadequate. Land-use planning was underdeveloped and poorly enforced. The choice to live outside the city also reflected essentially private marketplace development of low-cost public services.
Incumbent politicians defended Jacksonville's local government, but proponents of consolidation contended that the arrangement allowed buck-passing, with an inability or unwillingness to cope with emerging problems. The Democratic party "machine" had been dominated by a well-connected clique of railroad, financial, and media interests and had traded off public jobs for the black vote to continue its domination of local politics (see Thompson 1963) . The traditional "good old boy" network offered easy access and opportunities for businessmen to provide insurance, motor vehicles, and professional services in return for supporting the status quo.
The civil disorders of the 1960s were met by harsh political rhetoric, and curfews were imposed that set the city at odds with state and federal officials. Then-mayor Hyden Burns's political responses put him in good stead with the segregationists of north Florida in his campaign for governor, but the Democratic party's hold on the black vote was reduced. Moreover, the business elite felt that their downtown investments were threatened by the potential black majority. Changes in the ownership and policy direction of the local media further undermined acceptance of the prevailing political regime; the media began focusing on exposing waste, fraud, and abuse.
The traditional political culture in Jacksonville prior to consolidation was shaped by the belief that the role of government was to maintain the existing order (including political competition between elite-dominated factions), and it favored personalized government (Elazar 1975) . Newcomers to the military town were appalled by the lack of planning, low levels of public services, and the pretense, deceit, and concealment of political leaders (Bailey 1988) .
Justifications for Consolidation
Consolidation in Jacksonville was supported by reformers, the media, and academic entrepreneurs.
Reformers
Reformers justified consolidation's virtues, whereas incumbent politicians unsuccessfully attempted to justify the existing arrangements.
In 1965 the reformers received $100,000 in state funds to prepare a detailed blueprint of consolidation that was then used to mobilize support. The opponents relied on their party allies in the state legislature to negotiate important compromises such as retaining an elected sheriff, a property appraiser, and a supervisor of elections. Community elites were perplexed by numerous public-sector problems, including unfair property tax assessments, unaccredited schools, inadequate safety in the unincorporated area of Duval County, polluted streams, and stalled and declining growth rates. In addition, increased government costs led suburbanites to perceive unfair tax burdens for services, such as electricity for the city. Increased demand among suburbanites for urban-type services strained county resources. Moreover, indictments of local public officials for malfeasance prompted revision of governmental structure.
From 1960 to 1965, the reformers reviewed and rejected a number of alternative solutions; annexation was rejected by suburbanites in six of seven attempts. At that time, Florida's constitution did not provide for either realignment of functions or intergovernmental agreements that required governmental and financial flexibility. Independent functional authorities had already resulted in the loss of local control to the state. A "onetiered" consolidated government was proposed and supported by both inner-city blacks and suburban whites (but for different reasons), and the plan was approved in 1967. Today, citizens seem satisfied with the consolidated government, although their support for local leaders has vacillated over the years.
The Media
The media contributed to consolidation efforts by exposing the corrupt political practices of incumbents, by promoting the agenda of elites, by "educating" the community about local problems, and by rationalizing why consolidation was the solution. Promises of consolidation included jobs, lower taxes, wiser spending, and restoration of the city's posi-tion as a pacesetter in the state. Consolidation presumably would bring about a more responsive and responsible government that in turn would unify the citizens and make the community whole again.
As part of the Florida Times-Union's intensive campaign, opponents of consolidation were characterized as a dubious alliance of elected officials, influence peddlers, political bosses, and self-interested groups who feared losing personal monopolies based on political power. Businessmen believed that a merger would result in savings in the local government's central purchasing. The consolidation study commission, on the other hand, cited a number of public services that would require increased expenditures.
Opponents pointed to the biased nature of the Florida Times-Union. They accused it of overselling reform and engineering news releases to gain support for reform. They described the newspaper's stance as that of a "railroad-owned daily" that stood to gain low property taxes from a concentrated government with the "silent partners" of big business. The Advocate, a black weekly newspaper, charged that the Florida Times-Union was the real political "machine" in Jacksonville.
Academic Entrepreneurs
Academics have served as consultants to reform efforts, and many uncritically repeat the homilies of reform, intermingling empirical analysis with normative exhortations of what "should" and "must" be done. But these agents are not necessarily detached or "value neutral" in their study of the political dynamics of reform. Academics have engaged in virtually every aspect of reform, formulating the concepts, initiating action, designing the new government, promoting its adoption, explaining its approval or rejection, and assessing its achievements. In many cases, academics, perhaps unwittingly, have been the intellectual power behind the civic elites, who are the primary advocates of governmental reform. Their advocacy, writings, and advice tend to favor selective beneficiaries (Schneider, Teske, and Mintrom 1995) and their own entrepreneurial sentiments (Feiock and Carr, forthcoming) .
Around the time consolidation was being considered by Jacksonville, DeGrove, an academic and reformer, disseminated the scientific management views of public administration and that of the Committee for Economic Development (1966, (11) (12) (13) . This national business organization proposed that more than half of the local governments in the country be eliminated through consolidation. The Committee for Economic Development concluded the following about local government- DeGrove advocated a one-tiered government with the centralization of authority in the hands of the mayor of Jacksonville. Years later, as secretary of the Florida Department of Community Affairs, he was unsuccessful in his efforts to consolidate city-county governments elsewhere in Florida and in his call for the elimination of all small Florida municipalities under 5,000 in population.
Clarifications
Social scientists have offered numerous explanations of Jacksonville's break with its own tradition of governance. Some have ex-plored contributing factors such as race as a zero-sum game and the power dynamic of "deflation acceleration" to adopt consolidation. They also challenge the notions of "success" that consolidation had little or no impact on public spending, decreased political participation, and enhanced public "regardingness" (a little-used concept formulated by Banfield and Wilson [1964] , which means pursuit of the public good).
Factors Contributing to Consolidation
Race Card Glendening and White (1968) believed reorganization referendums are most likely to succeed in non-zero-sum game situations. That is, gains by one group would not be at another group's expense. Central-city voters (becoming predominantly black) gained a degree of direct political influence and representation as well as an expanded tax base. Suburbanites (predominantly white) gained an assurance of political control over the city, in which they work and play, and muchneeded public services.
A less benign view is offered by Sloan and French (1971) , who focus on efforts by whites to hold the line against the rise of black power and potential black rule in Jacksonville. Their precinct voting analysis showed that the largely inner-city black precincts favored consolidation but less so than largely white inner-city precincts. They asserted that what happened in Jacksonville was an old story. "At precisely that point in time when blacks threatened to wrest their share of political power from others, the rules of the game were changed" (Sloan and French 1971, 34) . Here, middle-class rhetoric avoids the "nastiness of racial conflict," leading an observer to overlook a crucial factor.
Power Game
In most urban areas, governance involves an implicit balance between political and business leaders. Consolidation can upset this balance and may result in considerable leadership instability. Either political or business leadership may, in some cases, emerge as the dominant partner. With their substantial advantage in resources, private-sector professionals can take advantage of some problems in the urban government (e.g., scandal, a power vacuum, or poor delivery of services) to assert their influence.
Jacksonville experienced instability in city leadership following consolidation. Business leadership replaced the "good ol' boys" of the Democratic party as the dominant partner. Business professionals were concerned primarily with "good government" and eliminating corruption. They were followed by a populist mayor, who put forth several referenda that were designed to challenge the prerogatives of what the corporate growth machine wanted. In subsequent elections, two pro-growth mayors, both of whom promoted multidimensional growth, were elected. Mayor Ed Austin secured an NFL franchise, and Mayor John Delaney obtained approval for a $353 million neighborhood protection project and a $2.2 billion infrastructure improvement plan. Jacksonville's consolidation, therefore, led to substantial instability and multiple changes in the community's power structure. Clarifiers should probe our understanding of power and leadership transformations. For example, does consolidation facilitate an executive-centered coalition (Dahl 1961) and/ or an urban regime power arrangement to get things done (Stone 1989) ?
Assessing the Consequences of Consolidation
Although most practitioners and journalists praised the adoption and accomplishments of Jacksonville's consolidation, social scientists were more discerning. Political scientist Carver (1973) asserted that the reformers had introduced public "regardingness." Carver found that the enhanced authority of the executive (i.e., mayor) served to pinpoint the credit and blame for the accomplishments and failures of the new polity. Consolidation increased the importance of professionalism in government and created closer ties between business and public officials. However, council representation of the minority and economic have-nots was tempered by the dominance of professionals and businessmen. The professionals reduced personal favoritism; the businessmen had a more influential voice in the new government. Carver (1973) interpreted the reelection of Mayor Hans Tanzler, a reformer, as a major indicator of popular support for consolidation. Most of the mayor's support came from white middle-class and black upper-class neighborhoods. Most leaders expressed enthusiasm for the responsiveness of the new government. However, although some black leaders appreciated having greater access, they were less convinced of the responsiveness of the political system to the black and the poorer elements of the community. Defeat of a proposed bond issue to finance downtown redevelopment was attributed to the working-class whites, whose influence in the new government was reduced.
According to Carver, the new government had shifted some public policy outputs, mainly distributive ones. The reformers moved decisively toward construction projects, with an emphasis on water and sewer programs and promotion of urban renewal and downtown redevelopment. They also installed streetlights and improved recreational programs in the suburbs. Since regulatory policies such as those pertaining to the environment were subject to considerable cross-pressures and tempered by practical considerations, they were modest achievements. Redistributive policies involving taxing and spending (the least attractive to the new government) were difficult to measure and interpret but seldom benefited the have-nots and minorities (Carver 1973) .
Benton and Gamble (1983) used a timeseries statistical technique to estimate the effect of the Jacksonville consolidation experience on three policy outputs: property tax revenues, total expenditures, and public safety expenditures. The time frame studied was 1955-81 (i.e., the 14 pre-consolidation years and 13 post-consolidation years), using for comparison purposes the Tampa-Hillsborough community that had rejected the consolidation option. The authors found that consolidation had an insignificant impact on property tax revenue. Per capita spending decreased in the short run but increased in the long run in Jacksonville. Although there was less spending for public safety, the considerable savings that had been expected did not materialize in Jacksonville. 1 Feiock, Seamon, and Dorsey (1994) also applied a time series to assess electoral participation, both 14 years before and 19 years after consolidation. They found that turnout in Jacksonville had decreased by some 18 percent, a significant decline, more so than in other urban counties in Florida. Their findings suggest that, contrary to expectations, political campaign contributions also increased. The candidates in the hotly contested 1991 mayoral race spent more than $1 million each. The winner, Mayor John Delaney, collected $400,000 in the last four weeks of the campaign to become the first Republican mayor to be elected in Florida since Reconstruction.
One of the primary motives for consolidation in Jacksonville was economic development. Bohland and Edwards (1990) suggest that consolidation initiatives stem from a coalition of local groups and individuals interested in promoting growth. In the case of Jacksonville, although growth was expected to benefit the entire community, certain interests more likely had an advantage (Swanson 1993) . Public policies that subsidized capital rather than labor resulted in an increase in the number of manufacturing firms but not wages (Carr and Feiock 1999) . Moreover, the city-county merger provided a vehicle to advance the agenda of certain groups without enhancing overall economic growth (Swanson and Roth 1995) .
Quandaries
The merger in Jacksonville raises numerous questions and prompts a discussion of future quandaries based on past experiences. Those who have earnestly sought to explain the contributing factors and probable consequences in Jacksonville have used a variety of conceptual and methodological frameworks selectively. Carver (1973) was cautious about the new polity's bias in favor of the economically well-to-do rather than the low-income groups. Feiock and colleagues have been rather sanguine about the long-term economic and political achievements of consolidation. Recently, the Jacksonville Community Council has expressed concern about the lack "of a commonly shared long-term vision, strategic coordination, and operational plans" (1997, 17) . The existence of socioeconomic-political bias needs therefore to be explored further.
For several decades, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) has formulated operational criteria to guide consideration of proposed local governmental reforms (ACIR 1974) . Emphasized are economic efficiency, equity, political accountability, and administrative effectiveness as important criteria when considering which government should provide which public service. Table 1 defines these criteria and illustrates the disjunction between the ideals and realities associated with the kind of reform embodied in the Jacksonville-Duval County consolidation.
Economic Efficiency
Three marketplace notions-economies of scale, public-sector competition, and public service pricing-tend to achieve efficiencies. Jacksonville reformers selectively and inadequately employed these notions by continuing to accept the transfer of marketplace principles to the public sector. The principle of scaled economies was violated when the city population of approximately 200,000 was merged with about 300,000 in the suburbs. By using per capita expenditures as a measure of an efficient size polity, scaled economies might exist somewhere between 50,000 and 150,000 in population (Hirsch 1967 )-less than the population of consolidated Jacksonville-Duval County. It is, however, unknown whether there is an optimum size government when considering the functions of a democratic polity (Dahl and Tufte 1973) .
There was public-private-sector competition in Jacksonville prior to consolidation in 1968. The private sector was an early source of service-delivery problems, which can be traced to the laissez-faire land development in the suburbs. Private water and sewer plants were inadequately designed and overutilized. Thus, some of the traditional demands for privatization to achieve efficiencies have not been promoted.
Most general services under the current merged government have no explicit price, making it more difficult to measure efficiencies. Utility services had rates before consolidation, but the electricity rate surcharge on Notes: Efficiency = provision of services at a low and/or per unit lower cost. Effectiveness = capacity and ability to achieve set objectives. Accountability = responsiveness of leaders to their followers. Equity = fairness in the delivery of public goods and services between communities in the metropolis and among neighborhoods within any city.
suburban customers and its contribution from "profits" (which are municipally owned) has primarily benefited inner-city taxpayers.
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Under the consolidated government, many fees for services are based on rough estimates of costs and benefits rather than measurable computations. For example, a storm-water fee is based on estimates of the square feet of a building and the cost to handle disposal. This "nickle-and-dime" practice is a part of the quest for revenues. Benton and Gamble (1983) have suggested that Jacksonville's reformers paid lip service to the economic efficiency theme but were really more interested in upgrading services. They note that the larger new polity could increase both tax receipts and expenditures without a concomitant increase in per capita taxes. However, the ratio of per capita property tax to per capita spending has increased in Jacksonville (by contrast, it has decreased in unconsolidated Tampa-Hillsborough). Opinion is divided regarding the effect of political structure on revenue and expenditure policies, especially on economic forces. Lineberry and Fowler (1967) have found only slight differences between the spending levels of reformed cities (that is, those with a city manager and that are nonpartisan and have atlarge elections) and unreformed cities. Benton and Gamble (1983) have deflated the importance of urban reform rhetoric, but Feiock (1992) has asserted that the tax burden actually increases.
Socioeconomic-Political Equity
According to the ACIR (1974), economic externalities and fiscal equalization should guide the consideration of proposed reforms. Ideally, costs and benefits of goods and services should accrue fully to producers and consumers. Otherwise, third parties may receive benefits without paying a price or may pay without receiving any benefit. Spending decisions and service provision should be informed by the notion of equalization, which focuses on social disparities between those who live in the central city and those who live in the suburbs. Equalization often is enforced through redistributive policies and programs. Nevertheless, throughout most state and local polities, bias exists that favors the majority and influential, often at the expense of minorities.
Noting the social disparities between those living in the central city and those living in the suburbs, the Jacksonville reformers sought and received federal funds to address housing, health, and welfare needs. However, the use of local funds was another matter. The reduction in property tax rates benefited those with higher property values. Furthermore, the shift away from property taxes to user charges placed a greater burden on lower income families. The extension of urban services to suburbanites would likely be at the expense of inner-city residents.
Through district representation, the reformers intended to address some of the inequities in Jacksonville by giving a voice to both inner-city blacks and suburban whites. Consolidation meant that property owners throughout the county would share in the costs of areawide public services, which the government was expected to distribute equitably.
Although consolidation tends to favor the core more than the periphery, the merger in Jacksonville reversed this notion. The black vote was diluted by consolidation; before the merger, over 40 percent of the population in the inner city was black, but in the new polity only one-quarter of the population comprised blacks. Although central-city blacks gained an increased tax base and a degree of access, representation, and influence, suburban whites continued to dominate politically. They shared in the distribution of the profits from the municipally owned electrical utility and paid a surcharge that was spent by the city. Later, suburban commuters benefited from the shift from bridge tolls to a sales tax on most goods.
Nevertheless, citizens from upper-, middle-, and low-income neighborhood organizations complained of unfair distribution of public services. A recent study (JCCI 1994, 18) distinguished between achieving adequacy and equality and correcting traditional inequities among six large planning districts. The study acknowledged that the city-county merger created "instant" inequities in service delivery, which the new government tried to eliminate.
Political Accountability
The ACIR (1974) formulated two criteria, access and control, to enhance the accountability of government to its citizens and to allow citizens to influence what government does. From the viewpoint of reformers, accountability did not exist prior to consolidation. Authority in Jacksonville was perceived as being dominated by a single party (i.e., a political "machine") and as having a fragmented governmental structure. Therefore, the government was considered unresponsive to the needs of the people. Not only was the jurisdiction between the city and county arbitrary, but the county had insufficient authority to provide urban services to the densely settled urbanized area. In addition, authority in the city was diffused among the mayor, a city commission with administrative responsibility, and a legislative city council. The reformers shortened the electoral ballot from 133 elective positions to 85.
To pinpoint responsibility, the reformers strengthened the executive role and diversified the legislative body. Nevertheless, electoral participation in Jacksonville was low and declined after consolidation (Feiock, Seamon, and Dorsey 1994) . Although insulated independent authorities (referred to as the "engines of growth" [Swanson 1993 ]) have undertaken many policy initiatives, citizen participation has been instrumental in supporting recent reforms and reversal of policy by the consolidated government. In the 1990s, large turnouts at city council meetings prompted city officials to adopt affirmative action and federal "set-aside" policies to provide minority access to contracts. Citizens also convinced elected officials to remove a newly imposed garbage fee. Voters approved term limits for elected officials and a tax cap on local property.
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Administrative Effectiveness
Metropolitan reformers rely most heavily on administrative effectiveness. They find fault with what they consider the high fragmentation of public authority, or the "balkanization" of the metropolis. For consolidationists, centralizing authority is the primary answer to gaining needed administrative effectiveness. In fact, ACIR's criteria include appropriate legal authority and geographic jurisdiction capability and the need to assign functions to general-purpose government to share in intergovernmental authority.
Local reformers in Jacksonville in the 1960s believed that consolidation would ensure administrative effectiveness. Reformers believed the design to improve government should include the best that could be negotiated under the circumstances of opposition. They firmly believed the centralization of authority would solve public problems, including unaccredited schools, overflowing private sewer plants, and traffic congestion.
Annual reports by mayors mention administrative and financial achievements. For example, in 1993 Mayor Ed Austin emphasized reduced costs in purchasing, legal services, data processing, motor pool, public relations, communications, printing, and personnel functions. His version of reinventing government was through "reengineering." Some believed the mayor should greatly expand efforts to improve efficiency throughout city government.
Although local officials believe they should have home rule to determine what is best for the community, an unfettered grant of legal authority may result in an impractical, excessively centralized, rigid system. The complexity of a government such as Jacksonville's results in delegations of authority that may exacerbate interlocal political conflict and confuse or complicate intergovernmental relations. Social scientists have examined per capita revenues and expenditures, levels of service, response times, and similar measures of service delivery but not improvements in administrative effectiveness.
Conclusion
Those who justified consolidation in Jacksonville-Duval County (i.e., community elites) had little doubt about their contribution to practical politics. They were convinced that consolidation would vastly improve the governance of the metropolis. Some 25 years after the merger, DeGrove and Turner asserted, "Consolidation unified resources for efficient budgeting of services, stopped the political polarization of the county in terms of race and social class, and created a new government free from the corruption charges that had undermined citizen confidence" (1991, 224) .
However, reformers have tended to ignore the efforts of those who doubt some of the successes of the merger, instead relying on those interpretations that nurture their preconceived ideas. Moreover, they have dealt primarily with the symptoms rather than the socioeconomic-political factors that contribute to the need to reform. They are pragmatic about human nature and contend that individual pursuit of gain can be transferred to running government like a business. They also selectively (and uncritically) tout the benefits of consolidation by promoting glossy economic development plans, such as The Better Jacksonville Plan (which was approved by voters in 2000 and is estimated to cost about $2.2 billion).
Social scientists, on the other hand, tend to dismiss the impressionistic, anecdotal insights of reformers and may be disgruntled that their own insights (and criticisms) are seldom acknowledged or accepted. These agents, who wish to clarify the so-called gains of consolidation, disdain experimentation without objective diagnosis and seek to better understand cause-and-effect factors that should give local officials pause before acting and consequently affecting the lives of their constituents. Unlike those who unhesitatingly justify consolidation and who focus on preferable futures without warrantable theories, social scientists consider probable consequences (given changing external-internal factors) and would more fully explore alternatives to consolidation. Social scientists should, however, recognize their own normative values inherent in their empirical research (Lindblom 1990 ). Moreover, they should not rely on readily available data or ignore actual practices.
In the future, those who analyze urban reform should pay more attention to leaderfollower relationships. They should focus not only on reinventing government but on restoring citizenship (Clarke and Gaile 1998) . To better understand the issues at stake, they should consider the interests of disadvantaged groups. They should ask, will the reform emphasize efficiency and effectiveness at the expense of accountability and equity? Will minority votes actually be diluted as a result of incorporation? Will the rearrangement yield differences in socioeconomic-political power? Will marketplace logic applied to public institutions make for a more sustainable, viable community? Neither reformers nor social scientists have fully appreciated the complexities and constraints of governing the metropolis. They should focus on enhancing the understanding of the citizenry, who must live with the consequences of urban reform. 
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